# Blockchain, Institutions and Technology 

Lawrence R. De Geest
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## Suddenly, farming

## commula property private property

But which came first: technology (farming) or institution (private property)?

## Was it because climate conditions

 improved?- That helped - but why then was adoption not uniform?
- The dog that did not bark: no Holocene revolution in certain places like Australia (even though conditions were favorable)


Age (Thousand years before present)

## Was it because farming was more productive?

Probably not!


## a one-way causal model is probably wrong

more likely: co-emergence of farming and private property

$\qquad$
$\rightarrow$ Sedentism $\rightarrow$

b
Fig. 1. Holocene coevolution of farming and private property. A conventional causal sequence is that $\mathbf{a}$ is a sufficient condition for $\mathbf{b}$, which is then followed by d. Our model and simulations suggest a coevolutionary scenario: In the absence of farming, $\mathbf{c}$ is a necessary condition for $\mathbf{d}$, which in conjunction with a provided the necessary but not sufficient conditions for $\mathbf{b}$.
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## Key idea: institutions emerge to solve problems

property rights regimes determine access to resources who can use it? who can be excluded?
benefit of private property regimes: individuals can more easily design contracts and trade (e.g. maize for millet). this was revolutionary! all roads point to trade as the biggest reason humans are rich
farming was probably adopted because it opened up new avenues for economic activity
we will look at blockchain in a similar way. like farming, we can ask: what problem is blockchain solving?

## Contract Theory

Contracts are essential to the functioning of modern societies. Oliver Hart's and Bengt Holmström's research sheds light on how contracts help us deal with conflicting interests.

Contracts specify the transfer of private property
As we will see, blockchain increases the contract space (the number/type of contracts people can enter)
why? because a major problem is that contracts are often incomplete (hard to write down what to do in every possible contingency)
leads to transaction costs (costs associated with doing business) like enforcement explains why we have the SEC and other centralized authorities regulating trade trade relies on trust, and trust is expensive
incomplete contracts can crowd-out trade
blockchain makes it possible to (somewhat) substitute trust with smart contracts (roll the terms of trade and execution of trade and enforcement into one)
applications? look for any setting where incomplete contracts significantly crowd-out exchange "How much more exchange would there have been if contracts were complete?" (e.g. governance, intellectual property, tracking asset ownership, public records)
key question: will it remove the need for central authority (e.g. central banks)? do we want that?

```
(a):% Jameson Lopp
@lopp
"Market protocols are programmable value-creation networks with economic structures that rival centrally managed organizations." -
@juanbenet \#MITBitcoinExpo2018
cryptocurrencies (digital currency - code as coin) abound

focus less on the currency market and more on what the currency is: a means for participating in a blockchain
why? b/c if a blockchain is valuable, the currency is valuable


a buyer and seller enter into a contract
markets facilitate voluntary trade between buyers and sellers
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for the contract to be executed, attributes of the trade need to verified
e.g. the quality of the good, authenticity of payment. trivial if trade happens in person. the only intermediary is the central backing the currency used in the trade
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3rd party verification relies on monitoring users and enforcing contracts.
a big part of this is collecting information above and beyond what is needed if contracts were complete.
what if this information leaks?
e.g. credit card data, social security numbers
leakages: information could be sold by intermediary, or it could be stolen
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Facebook's data gold rush: Web giant's takings soared by \(£ 12\) BILLION after it let 3rd party verification relies on monitoring users and enforcincompanies hoover up users' data a big part of this is collecting information above and beyon NEW The social media what if this information leaks? e.g. credit card data, social security numbers leakages: information could be sold by intermediary,

\title{
Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks
}

\section*{8A}
\({ }_{3}\) Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
"We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the coin. A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of ownership."

Amazon and Ebay are centralized markets

\section*{transactions are verified and executed by the intermediary}
what if you could substitute trust in intermediary with trust in code?
information about the buyer/seller and/or the good can be digitized
it can then be stored on a "distributed ledger" that can be viewed by a decentralized market
the market can then verify transactions by agreeing on the true state of the ledger - crowed-sourced verification
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline Height & Time & Relayed By & Hash & Size (kB) \\
\hline 514134 (Main Chain) & 2018-03-18 19:56:50 & ViabTC & 0000000000000000003523b6696867990c7e946020b5d91975620c9afe3d8eb3 & 1,112.12 \\
\hline 514133 (Main Chain) & 2018-03-18 19:18:28 & BTC.TOP & 000000000000000000270d96fal1763a0bbf8645fc3ad35352ff81388bf90ee7b & 1,166.45 \\
\hline 514132 (Main Chain) & 2018-03-18 19:02:28 & AntPool & 000000000000000000421f2ec02f8a0020ca050fc 1acb8c 12209a70638de352c & 122.05 \\
\hline 514131 (Main Chain) & 2018-03-18 19:00:48 & ViabTC &  & 1,266.83 \\
\hline 514130 (Main Chain) & 2018-03-18 18:59:12 & AntPool & 0000000000000000003fa30b5d5157af623d3db0122cf22da2ef14F7cffdf729 & 279.85 \\
\hline 514129 (Main Chain) & 2018-03-18 18:56:11 & Bitcoin.com & 0000000000000000002481 c4bd3c61 ce4c571ee365650af63512ac7265a99803 & 111.26 \\
\hline 514128 (Main Chain) & 2018-03-18 18:52:14 & AntPool & 0000000000000000003d7500f3036e0dd 17703264daed3a9d2bf8888d889a554 & 1,077.95 \\
\hline 514127 (Main Chain) & 2018-03-18 18:38:56 & F2Pool & 00000000000000000004a011d058296d900fe2b51665d051dafil32abdd5e793c76 & 163.63 \\
\hline 514126 (Main Chain) & 2018-03-18 18:36:49 & BTC.com & \(00000000000000000014 d d 997 b 8 b b d 7 c 1 c 154 d 89159 b t 33 C 255639110352\) cc59 & 620.78 \\
\hline 514125 (Main Chain) & 2018-03-18 18:29:55 & SlushPool & 0000000000000000004da3f10312a139123d82891fa719175dba64da570035f3 & 182.93 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


Suppose I want to buy your used car with a Bitcoin
Problem: what if I already spent it? How do you confirm I'm not "double-spending"? Traditionally this is the domain of a central authority.
"The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to be aware of all transactions..To accomplish this without a trusted party, transactions must be publidy announced, and we need a system for participants to agree on a single history of the order in which they were received."

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That system is blockchain: a sequential database secured with cryptography
The idea of "chains of blocks" has been around since Haber and Stornett (1991)
a "block" is a bundle of data (e.g. transactions, property rights)
it is computationally cheaper to authorize a block of transactions than each transaction alone
by "chaining" blocks you can deter fraud

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What makes Bitcoin so interesting is how it combines three technologies to create a blockchain:
1. private key cryptography
digital signature \(=\) private key + public key

2. a decentralized P2P network (the internet)
3. a protocol (rules of the game) based on time-stamped hashes to authenticate transactions
hash = function that takes variable-length input and produces a fixed-length hexadecimal output
3 desiderata:
1. small changes in input should lead to totally different output
2. knowledge of output does not lead you to input
3. no collisions

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Bitcoin uses SHA-256:
```

> library(digest)
> hash1 <- digest("This lecture is awesome", algo = "sha256")
> hasiz <- digest("This lecture is boring", algo = "sha256")
> hash3 <- digest("What is this lecture even about and why am I here", algo = "sha256")
> print(hash1)
[1] "2f34fee999b59b3576b4f770ae8b6e7ad7327f78e4154830bbe71034acbe1961"
> print(hash2)
[1] "42007a45779ab7f48fc1a4294c0ad7fc40c31d7e5fca5426cf38adea77a2a14a"
> print(hash3)
[1] "6f3b84ef48729e72ffde574339e298934ef9a8859805ea3535ed5d99187a07af"
> nchar(hash1); nchar(hash2); nchar(hash3)
[1] }6
[1] }6
[1] }6

```
a bitcoin is valuable b/c it stores the memory of pervious transactions

Kocherlakota (1998) "money is memory"
a bitcoin is valuable b/c it stores the memory of pervious transactions

Let's look at how blockchains work

We will use the Bitcoin version as an example
(Remember: Bitcoin is just the token used to participate in the blockchain)

The blockchain should have three key features:
1. a way for the network of users to authorize transactions
2. an incentive for users to
3. a way to deter fraud

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We make a transaction - let's call it "Tx0"

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Our transaction needs to be verified

Who will verify it? The network.

How? Mining.

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Some nodes are "miners"

They collect a bunch of transactions
(including ours) into a block
Then they race to find the
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\section*{How do you find the block header?}

How do you find the block header?
\[
h(\cdot): S \rightarrow S
\]
\[
\begin{array}{r}
m \in M \\
h\left(m^{*}\right)=h^{*}
\end{array}
\]

\section*{How do you find the block header?}

\section*{By solving this puzzle:}

Find a number that when combined with data in the block and passed through a hash function produces a hexadecimal output (a "hash") within a certain range

This number is called a "nonce" (number used once) What is the "range"? A number of leading zeros in the hash.


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Suppose the range is a hexadecimal with at least 3 zeros.
What you do is re-hash the block over and over again, changing the nonce each time:

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```

block+0 => "1312af178c253f84028d480a6adc1e25e81caa44c749ec81976192e2ec934c64"
block+1 => "e9afc424b79e4f6ab42d99c81156d3a17228d6e1eef4139be78e948a9332a7d8"
block+2 => "ae37343a357a8297591625e7134cbea22f5928be8ca2a32aa475cf05fd4266b7"
block+998 => "6e110d98b388e77e9c6f042ac6b497cec46660deef75a55ebc7cfdf65cc0b965"
block+999 => "c004190b822f1669cac8dc37e761cb73652e7832fb814565702245cf26ebb9e6"
block+1000 => "0000c3af42fc31103f1fdc0151fa747ff87349a4714df7cc52ea464e12dcd4e9"

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block+2 => "ae37343a357a8297591625e7134cbea22f5928be8ca2a32aa475cf05fd4266b7"
block+998 => "6e110d98b388e77e9c6f042ac6b497cec46660deef75a55ebc7cfdf65cc0b965"
block+999 => "c004190b822f1669cac8dc37e761cb73652e7832fb814565702245cf26ebb9e6"
block+1000 => "0000c3af42fc31103f1fdc0151fa747ff87349a4714df7cc52ea464e12dcd4e9"

```

In this example it took 1000 tries

In general, a winning hash can only be found through trial-and-error

Now what? You broadcast your block to network. Other nodes verify it and then add it to the chain


The whole song-and-dance is a "proof of work"

Why do it? Because if you find a winning hash, you "mine" Bitcoin for yourself

This is the incentive for contributing your computing resources to the verification process Takes the place of the fee a central authority would charge

So miners compete for the right to add the next block to the chain

What is going is decentralized consensus over the "ledger" (the transaction history)
The network "agrees" on the "true state of the ledger" by "voting" with their CPUs
Accepting blocks by working on the next one, ignoring blocks by refusing
to work on them

Why does proof of work deter fraud? Why can't somebody cook the books?

Notice how each block contains info from the previous block, specifically the hash:


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Notice how each block contains info from the previous block, specifically the hash:


Since each block "remembers" the previous block, if you change the previous block (e.g. alter or delete a transaction), then by definition you change the current block.

\section*{The chain is immutable.}

You can't just adjust a single block - you have to adjust the entire chain!
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 \\
\hline 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 \\
\hline 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 \\
\hline 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 \\
\hline 17 & 18 & 19 & 20 \\
\hline 21 & 22 & 23 & 24 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Suppose the network is working on block 24
an attacker wants to change a transaction in block 17
the attacker would have to then change blocks 18 to 23, before the network completes block 24!
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The only way an attacker could alter the chain is if it had at least half the network's total computing power

But even if it did, then it would be better off using that computing power for mining

\section*{The work is expensive Proving the work done is cheap}

A blockchain is only as secure as its computing power Network effects play a large role

Unfortunately proof of work is very wasteful Jan '18: mining consumes 40.64 TWh More than Hungary

And economies of scale in mining mean that as the blockchain becomes more valuable, it also becomes less decentralized
Concerns about market power
The Bitcoin blockchain is also very slow VISA: ~57k transactions per second BTC: ~ 7 transactions per second



Note: Energy consumption estimated based on global mining hash rate multiplied by average Joule/gigahash/s
energy usage, which we assume declines linearly from 1.5 in 2014 to 0.2 in 2017


Key point: since there are tradeoffs to blockchain design, no single blockchain will suit every transaction type

What are these tradeoffs?
1. Security
2. Privacy
3. Transaction size (e.g. Litecoin vs Bitcoin)
4. Nature of the transaction (e.g. exchange of value, executing a legal contract, etc)
5. Permissionless vs. permissioned
e.g. Australian Securities Exchange
despite issues, bitcoin shows how blockchain can reduce:

\section*{1. cost of verification}
2. cost of networking
also shows that we probably won't eliminate intermediaries - just change their nature
as we saw, farming was not adopted because it was immediately better, but because it increased the scope of feasible economic activity

Earlier we said "look for where contracts are incomplete"

Now we can be more specific

Look for where:
verification costs are high
platform operators enjoy uncompetitive rents
privacy / censorship risk is high


Blockchains can efficiently deliver digital goods/services that were previously tough to contract on

\section*{Computation}

\section*{Storage}

\section*{f) Filecoin}

Filecoin is a data storage network and electronic currency based on Bitcoin.



Use Filecoin to store files in the network or to transact


Exchange Filecoin for othe currencies, like Bitcoin

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\section*{Computation}

\section*{ethereum}

\section*{Storage}

\section*{f Filecoin}

Filecoin is a data storage network and electronic currency based on Bitcoin.


Earn Filecoin by
renting disk space


Use Filecoin to store files in the network or to transact



\section*{Blockchain revived the old(ish) notion of smart contracts}
"Smart contracts are digital contracts allowing terms contingent on decentralized consensus that are self-enforcing and tamper-proof through automated execution."

\section*{(Cong \& He 2018)}
"A canonical real-life example, which we might consider to be the primitive ancestor of smart contracts, is the humble vending machine."
(Szabo 1996)

Many contracts are incomplete b/c they rely on contingencies (stuff that may or may not happen in the future) Delivery, performance, weather...

As a result they can be costly to enforce

The idea of a smart contract is to roll the contract and its execution (and thus its enforcement) all in one

Blockchains can also deliver attributes of non-digital goods/services (e.g property rights)

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Could intellectual property be replaced with blockchain?


Blockchains can also deliver attributes of non-digital goods/services (e.g property rights)


Identification / electronic medical records?
Would people license their privacy?

Tracking food production
Walmart + IBM

Reputation

Self-driving cars buying/selling lane space?

Blockchain is good for auditing / tracking / time stamping / consensus

Many applications to finance and management:

Transparently reward contributions to financial prediction models. (Numerai)

Corporate governance
Reduce incentive for strategic default

Fewer lawyers / instant settlements

Exercising options in derivatives
\(\$ 65 \mathrm{~b}-\$ 85 \mathrm{~b}\) : cost of clearing, settling, and managing the post-trade processes in securities

Instant transfer of collateral in event of default / Instant compensation if performance goals are met

Trade finance (especially cross-border trade)

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Largest gain may be in signaling benefits
Firm willing to write smart contracts is credible signal of quality

The big question is whether digital currency will replace central authority

Bitcoin created to compete with central banks
algorithmic vs discretionary monetary policy

If central bank loses monopoly power, then supply and demand will drive which money is used as a medium of exchange.

Is more competition in currency better?

Yes: more flexibility for contracting parties to choose settlement terms
No:
- could lead to credit constraints
- harder to conduct any kind of monetary policy
- licensing laws make it easier to regular threat from competition currencies, thus easier to combat tax evasion and money laundering

\section*{Option 1: central bank issues digital currency ("FedCoin")}

Allow citizens to deposit directly to central bank

When you spend a FedCoin, you transfer it over a blockchain.


CB would have exclusive right to modify or add or delete transactions.
Blockchain would not be transparent. (Is this a blockchain at all?)
Exploits low cost of verification, but not networking
Since you deal directly with CB, it would end fractional reserve banking
Commit to algorithmic money creation
Smart contracts that alter algorithm based on future contingencies
CB has better understanding of financial system, thus improve interventions
Reduce interest rates below zero

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\section*{Option 2: Blockchain only}

Allow CB to move money more reliably and cheaply between depositors Estimating savings in processing and bookkeeping costs are 50-80\%. Average cost of a money transfer was \(7.37 \%\) worldwide (2015) and take several days and many layers of verification

Allow CB to more directly monitor depositor banks, easier to identify money laundering and tax evasion and general fraud
(Hopefully) Inspire confidence in banking system

We saw that two revolutionary advancements, property rights and farming co-evolved
Does blochain + digital currency present a new and important co-evolution?

It depends on our ability to identify the size of the marginal gains Not every market needs blockchain

We saw that two revolutionary advancements, property rights and farming co-evolved

Does blochain + digital currency present a new and important co-evolution?

It depends on our ability to identify the size of the marginal gains Not every market needs blockchain

\section*{What tradeoffs is a society willing to make? \\ Imagine if elections were conducted on blockchain \\ Imagine if professors administered classes on blockchain}
"Blockchain and smart contracts can sustain market equilibria with a larger range of economic outcomes." (Cong \& He 2018)

\section*{WIT Computational Finance Club}

\section*{Wednesdays 7-8pm}
```

import matplotlib
import pandas as pd
from binance.enums import *
from binance.client import Client
import json
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
keys = json.load(open('keys.json'))
client = Client(keys['public'], keys['private'])
prices = client.get_all_tickers()
client.get_recent_trades(symbol = "POWRETH")
depth = client.get_order_book(symbol = S)
df = pd.DataFrame(depth)
df['asks_min'] = df['asks'].str[0]
df['asks_max'] = df['asks'].str[1]
df['bids_min'] = df['bids'].str[0]
df['bids_max'] = df['bids'].str[1]
df = df.drop(df.columns[[0,1]], axis=1)
df.loc[:,'asks_min':'bids_max'] = df.loc[:,'asks_min':'bids_max'].apply(pd.to_numeric)

```

\section*{Email: degeestl@wit.edu}

Web: lrdegeest.github.io

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